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Linda McDougal was the victim of medical malpractice.' As a conse-
quence of a pathologist confusing the results of McDougal's biopsy with
those of another patient, she underwent an unnecessary double mastec-
tomy.2 Unlike nearly five million uninsured Texans,3 McDougal had in-
surance and it covered her medical expenses.4 In addition, her employer
paid her salary while she was unable to work.' As a result, Linda Mc-
Dougal had no net economic loss; it was zero.6 Regardless of the lack of
economic damages, she still had the option to sue the negligent patholo-
gist for the non-economic damages she suffered.7 Today, a similar non-
economic damage claim in Texas against such a doctor, under our medical
malpractice law, the loss attributed to an unnecessary double mastectomy
would be worth no more than $250,000.8
B. Real Problem
Since taking office, Governor Rick Perry has rigorously championed
his efforts "to ensure that all Texans have access to quality, affordable
health care."9 One of five key priorities indexed on his web page is la-
beled 'Health Care'. 10 The Governor has "proposed a series of initiatives
to expand Texans' access to health care, and he also has outlined correc-
tive measures to fix the medical lawsuit abuse crisis that is hurting doctors
and patients across the state.""l The Governor's words beg the question:
how do legislators and public officials balance the push to limit medical
malpractice lawsuit "abuse" and the need for Texans to have access to
quality, affordable health care? The Legislature's answer is the passage
of House Bill 4 and its non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice
1. Kristin Loiacono, Forgotten Faces, TRIAL, Mar. 1, 2003, 2003 WL 11576894.
2. Id.
3. See State of Texas, Health and Human Services Commission (outlining demo-
graphic and socioeconomic statistic/indicators for Texans without health insurance in 2001)
available at http://www.hhsc.tx.us/research/dssi/txunin2001.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).




8. Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S. ch. 204, § 74.301, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
847, 873.
9. State of Texas, Office of the Governor, http://www.governor.state.tx.us/prioritiesl
healthcare (last visited Jan 29, 2004) (listing health care priorities outlined by the Gover-
nor) (hereinafter Office of the Governor).




cases.12 While House Bill 4 caps non-economic damages in medical mal-
practice cases at $250,000,13 this type of legislation poses a real threat to
the rights of medical malpractice victims.
This comment will discuss the effect non-economic damage caps in
medical malpractice cases have on an injured victim's rights to bring a
cause of action against a negligent party. Part I has introduced the prob-
lem. Part II will discuss the origins of Texas non-economic damage caps
in medical malpractice cases and the Texas Legislature's reasons for en-
acting them. It will further address how Texas courts have interpreted the
caps coupled with the Legislature's efforts to ensure the caps pass consti-
tutional muster.
Part III will enumerate the rights threatened by the non-economic
damages caps and the recently passed companion constitutional amend-
ment.14 It will specifically illustrate the unconstitutional aspects of the
statutory cap on non-economic damages pertaining to the Equal Protec-
tion of the law, the Open Courts Doctrine, the Right of Trial by Jury, the
Prohibition of Special Laws, the Separation of Powers and conflicting
constitutional provisions. Part III will also demonstrate how the compet-
ing interests of health care providers, insurance companies, and insured/
uninsureds are intertwined with the above issues. This section will also
discuss the insurance industry's success in the political arena and the re-
sulting injuries to the uninsured, most notably the poor. Included within
the constitutional analysis is what effect, if any, House Bill 4 and Proposi-
tion 12 will have on reducing medical malpractice insurance premiums
and making health care more affordable.
Part IV will discuss proposals for improving medical malpractice law-
suit reform, reducing insurance rates and making health care available to
every person. Specifically, it will discuss a patient compensation fund and
the passage of insurance rate regulations.
Lastly, Part V will conclude with a summation of the statute's unconsti-
tutionality and the need to address the current assault on medical mal-
practice victims' rights and the power of the courts.
12. § 74.301, Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 873.
13. Id.
14. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66.
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II. BACKGROUND - ORIGINS OF TEXAS' MED- MAL NON-ECONOMIC
DAMAGE CAPS
A. Texas Legislature Takes Notice
In 1975, the Texas Legislature recognized the problem posed by in-
creases in medical malpractice insurance premiums,15 and in response, it
created the "Texas Medical Professional Liability Study Commission."16
The Commission's function was to ascertain the reasons why malpractice
insurance rates were dramatically increasing for doctors and other health
care providers. 17 The Commission conducted hearings and submitted
recommendations to the Legislature. 8 Based on its finding in 1977, the
Legislature enacted the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act (the Act), formerly known as 4590i. 19 The Legislature stated the pur-
poses of the Act were to:
(1) [rjeduce [the] excessive frequency and severity of health care lia-
bility claims through reasonable improvements and modifications in
the Texas insurance, tort, and medical practice systems; (2) decrease
the cost of those claims and assure that awards are rationally related
to actual damages; (3) do so in a manner that will not unduly restrict
a claimant's rights any more than necessary to deal with the crisis; (4)
make available to physicians, hospitals, and other health care provid-
ers protection against potential liability through the insurance mech-
anism at reasonably affordable rates; (5) make affordable medical
and health care more accessible and available to the citizens of
Texas; (6) make certain modifications in the medical, insurance, and
legal systems in order to determine whether or not there will be an
effect on rates charged by insurers for medical professional liability
insurance; and (7) make certain modifications to the liability laws as
they relate to health care liability claims only and with an intention
of the legislature to not extend or apply such modifications of liabil-
ity laws to any other area of the Texas legal system or tort law.2°




19. Act of Aug. 29, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, Part 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039,




B. Courts Interpret the Act
Since the Act's passage, the Legislature's medical malpractice non-eco-
nomic damage caps have faced resistance in various courts of appeals, 2 '
though there has been some support upholding the validity of such caps.22
In 1988, a certified question was posed by the United State Fifth Circuit
Court to the Texas Supreme Court in Lucas v. United States,2 3 focusing on
whether non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice cases are
consistent with the Texas Constitution. 24 The Texas Supreme Court con-
cluded that the "damages limitations contained in sections [then-]11.02
and 11.03 of [then-]article 4590i violate article I, § 13 of the Texas Consti-
tution., 25 From the passage of the Act to the Lucas decision, the debate
surrounding the necessity for non-economic damage caps in medical mal-
practice cases has most recently been concentrated among various inter-
est groups contending that caps will have some impact on healthcare.26
In 2000, the Texas Supreme Court in Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v.
Auld recognized the Legislature's finding of "a serious problem in availa-
bility of and affordability of adequate medical professional liability insur-
ance" coupled with a "material adverse effect on the delivery of medical
and health care in Texas.",27 Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court has
acknowledged that a major impetus of the Legislature was to deter the
amount of frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits filed against doctors
21. See generally Baptist Hospital of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296,
297-98 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1984), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 714 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex.
1986) (holding the considered portions of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improve-
ment Act unconstitutional); Detar Hospital, Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 365-366
(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ) (holding the broad and absolute limitations of
the Act are unconstitutional).
22. Rose v. Doctors Hospital Facilities, 735 S.W.2d 244, 251-252 (Tex.App.-Dallas
1987, writ granted) affirmed by Rose v. Doctors Hospital Facilities, 801 S.W.2d 841, 842
(Tex. Dec 19, 1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act based on the rational relationship between its methods and the goals it
seeks to achieve).
23. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 687 (Tex. 1988).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 692.
26. Compare Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, Lawsuit Limitations Common (report-
ing that non-economic damage caps will produce 12 percent more practicing doctors) avail-
able at http://www.calahouston.org/propl2-1.html (on file with author) with Texas Watch,
Vote Against Proposition 12 (HJR3) (explaining why non-economic damage caps are bad
for Texas and is nothing more than political gamesmanship) available at http://www.tcra-
online.com/newslet/Texas%20Watch.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2003).
27. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Tex. 2000).
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"and other health care providers., 2 8 The Texas Legislature concluded
that doctors and other health care providers were being bombarded with
frivolous claims and could not afford to defend themselves.2 9 The Legis-
lature identified the increase of these types of lawsuits as the major factor
contributing to the rise in health care costs for all Texans."
C. Texas Legislature Re-groups
In 2003, the 78th Legislature passed House Bill 4,31 which repealed ar-
ticle 4590i and replaced it with what will be codified as Chapter 74 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.32 Section 74.301 states in pertinent
part:
(a) In an action on a health care liability claim where final judgment
is rendered against a physician or health care provider other than a
health care institution, the limit of civil liability for non-economic
damages of the physician or health care provider other than a health
care institution, inclusive of all persons and entities for which vicari-
ous liability theories may apply, shall be limited to an amount not to
exceed $250,000 for each claimant, regardless of the number of de-
fendant physicians or health care providers other than a health care
institution against whom the claim is asserted or the number of sepa-
rate causes of action on which the claim is based.
(b) In an action on a health care liability claim where final judgment
is rendered against a single health care institution, the limit of civil
liability for non-economic damages inclusive of all persons and enti-
ties for which vicarious liability theories may apply, shall be limited
to an amount not to exceed $250,000 for each claimant.
(c) In an action on a health care liability claim where final judgment
is rendered against more than one health care institution, the limit of
civil liability for noneconomic damages for each health care institu-
tion, inclusive of all persons and entities for which vicarious liability
theories may apply, shall be limited to an amount not to exceed
28. Hart v. Wright, 16 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied);
Martinez v. Lakshmikanth, 1 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet.
denied).
29. Schorp v. Baptist Mem'l Health Sys., 5 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1999, no pet.).
30. Id.
31. Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 74.301, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
873.
32. E-mail from Bruce R. Anderson, Attorney, Brin & Brin, P.C. Attorneys at Law,
to Ruben James Reyes, Law Student, St. Mary's University School of Law (Sept. 23, 2003,
15:25:24 CST) (on file with author). For purposes of this comment and future reference,
House Bill 4 will sometimes be referred to in its future codification form, i.e. §74.301.
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$250,000 for each claimant and the limit of civil liability for
noneconomic damages for all health care institutions, inclusive of all
persons and entities for which vicarious liability theories may apply,
shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $500,000 for each
claimant.33
In the event that the above non-economic damage caps provisions
would not pass constitutional muster, the Texas Legislature provided an
alternative damages scheme. 34 Additionally, to protect House Bill 4 from
constitutional challenges, the Legislature passed House Joint Resolution
3, commonly referred to as Proposition 12." On Saturday, September 13,
2003, Proposition 12 was voted on and passed by a narrow margin of 51%
For and 49% Against.36 Proposition 12 will be codified in Article III,
Section 66 of the Texas Constitution.37
Proposition 12 authorizes the Legislature to set limits on non-economic
damages.38 It applies to limitations in medical malpractice liability cases
and all other tort actions.39 The Legislature, with House Bill 4 and its
narrowly-voter-approved enabling Proposition 12, once again ventures to
resolve problems affecting the efficiency of Texas courts n.4  Given the
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Lucas regarding 4590i medical mal-
practice non-economic damage caps, it appears inevitable that House Bill
4's constitutionality will be challenged in Texas courts.
33. Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 74.301(a)-(c), 2003 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 873 (emphasis added).
34. Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 74.302, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
873.
35. Tex. H.J.R. Res. 3, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
36. Laylan Copelin and David Pasztor, Limits on Damages Narrowly Approved, Aus-
tin-American Statesman, available at http://www.statesman.com/metrostate/content/elec-
tion/2003/0913propl2.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
37. HOUSE COMM. ON CIVIL PRACTICES, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.J.R. 3, 78th Leg.,
R.S. (2003), at http://204.65.51.20/data/hrofr/pdf/ba78r/HJR0003.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Id. I recognize that the "all other tort actions" language opens up many doors for
legal attacks upon this constitutional amendment. These issues will be left for other col-
leagues to comment upon and can be better addressed when the 79th Legislature attempts
to utilize the power it has given itself.
40. See Jones v. Raytheon Aircraft Services Inc., 120 S.W.3d 40, 49 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (Marion, J., dissenting) (discussing the act passed in response to





The Texas Constitution states that "[all free men, when they form a
social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to
exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration
of public services."4 The United States Constitution states that:
[A]I1 persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.4 2
Opponents of non-economic damage caps assert that medical malprac-
tice reform legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States.43 This same argument can be applied to the Texas Constitution.
Consequently, injured medical malpractice victims may argue that non-
economic damage caps directly or disparately violate equal protection be-
cause of the creation of an impermissible classification distinguishing be-
tween injured victims with calculable economic damages and injured
persons with no economic damages.44
To illustrate this point, consider these two hypothetical medical mal-
practice victims. 45 Victim A is a middle-aged, white male who earns a
decent $50,000 annual wage as an insurance salesman. Victim B is an
elderly woman who has been retired from work for the last five years and
earns no income. Both victims visit Doctor X for an infected hangnail
and he misdiagnosed each patient with cancer of the left foot. On ac-
count of their doctor's advice, each patient has their respective misdiag-
nosed foot amputated. Victim A has both economic damages (lost
income and incurred medical bills) and non-economic damages (pain and
suffering). Victim B has no economic damages (except her medical bills)
and she too can file suit for her pain and suffering. The Texas non-eco-
41. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. E.g., Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 769-72 (Ohio 1991); Best v. Taylor Mach.
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1063 (Ill. 1997).
44. See Mathew W. Light, Note, Who's The Boss?: Statutory Damage Caps, Courts
and State Constitutional Law, 58 Wash. Lee. L. Rev. 315, 341 (Winter 2001) (citing Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1075 (IIl. 1997)).
45. The above hypothetical is used only to illustrate a point. I in no way intend to




nomic damage caps permit Victim B to recover up to only $250,000 for
the traumatic event while Victim A can recover up to $250,000 plus eco-
nomic damages far beyond medical expenses. Thus, assuming the medi-
cal expenses are equal, Victim A's total recovery may greatly exceed
Victim B's total recovery. Consider also, Victim B is retired and she
cares for her 5 grandchildren and 1 great-grandchild. As a result of her
injury, Victim B will never again be physically able to provide the care
she did prior to the medical mistake. The Texas Legislature will not per-
mit a jury to award Victim B beyond the capped amount and the result of
the statute's application is an impermissible distinction between victims
with the ability to earn a working wage and those victims who can not.
Assuming that a medical malpractice victim's fundamental or impor-
tant right to full trial by jury is not abridged, the Texas cap on non-eco-
nomic damages must fail as it is unreasonable and arbitrary legislation.46
The Texas Legislature is attempting to protect health care providers and
their insurance companies regardless of the disparate effect caps have on
medical malpractice victims who have little or no economic damages. By
imposing limitations upon those injured patients, the cap further prevents
those victims from a full and fair trial.47
"There are three tiers to the equal protection analysis." 48 Under an
equal protection analysis, the United States Supreme Court has estab-
lished the strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational related
tests.4 9 The application of one of the tiers depends upon the classification
drawn by a statute or the asserted right that is at issue.5" The rational
related test finds that state action is, generally, "presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest."51 Specifically, there is a
46. See Steve Fox, Constitutional Roadblocks to Michigan's Cap on Non-economic
Damages in Product Liability Suits, 47 Wayne L. Rev. 1385, 1391 (discussing that Michi-
gan's legislative intent to impose limitations on product liability recovery is clearly unrea-
sonable and arbitrary). I make reference to Steve Fox's article multiple times throughout
this comment in an effort to apply the critiques regarding the constitutionality of products
liability non-economic damage caps in Michigan, to the Texas cap on non-economic dam-
ages in medical malpractice suits.
47. See id. at 1385.(stating that the product liability cap in Michigan unconstitutionally
infringes the plaintiff's right to seek recovery).
48. In re Living Centers of America, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
49. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the strict scrutiny
test); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985) (discussing the
rational related test); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (discussing the intermediate
level of scrutiny).
50. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492.
51. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40 (1985); Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687, 704
(Tex. 1988) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
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presumption of constitutionality applied to the statute, and the statute
will be upheld "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it."52 However, if a classification disadvantages a suspect class or in-
fringes upon a fundamental right, then government action is subject to
strict scrutiny.53 Strict scrutiny requires a showing that the statute is
closely tailored to promote a compelling state interest.54 To survive an
intermediate level of scrutiny, the statute in question must be substan-
tially related to achieve an important governmental interest. 55 Given the
three different standards of review, the question that necessarily follows
is whether a medical malpractice victim's right to redress is so fundamen-
tally important that the statute must bear more than a mere rational rela-
tionship test.
While the strict scrutiny standard should apply, not only would the
non-economic damages cap fail this standard, but it should also fall under
the rational related test.56 The statutory cap clearly effects an injured
victim's "fundamental right to a jury trial.",57 It is not here asserted that a
medical malpractice victim has a fundamental right to damages or eco-
nomic damages. Rather, it is the injured plaintiffs' unimpeded "right to a
meaningful jury trial which is offended by [a] statutory cap on
damages."58
The right to a fair jury trial in medical malpractice cases is fundamen-
tal.59 The strict scrutiny test states that a statute must be precisely tai-
lored to serve a compelling government interest.6 °  The Texas
Legislature's interest "is not to bring predictability to" medical malprac-
tice jury awards. 61 "The processes of remittitur and additur are already in
place to ensure that jury awards remain predictable., 62 Furthermore,
"there is no evidence that the [statutory] cap could effectuate its intended
52. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40 (1985); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 704; Lens Ex-
press, Inc. v. Ewald, 907 S.W.2d 64, 69 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
53. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
54. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (1985); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 704.
55. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 704; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
56. Fox, supra note 46, at 1398.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15.
60. E.g, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Lu-
cas,757 S.W.2d at 703-04.
61. Cf., Fox, supra note 46, at 1398 (asserting Michigan's products liability cap does
not bring predictability to jury awards while it "marginally shelves" the interest of lowering
insurance rates).
62. Id. at 1399.
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purpose."63 This contention is supported by a recent United States Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) report on medical malpractice.64 The
GAO's pertinent results in brief are as following:
[A]ctions taken by health care providers in response to malpractice
pressures have contributed to localized health care access problems
in the five states we reviewed with reported problems. We con-
firmed instances in the five states where actions taken by physicians
in response to malpractice pressures have reduced access to services
affecting emergency surgery and newborn deliveries. These in-
stances were not concentrated in any one geographic area and often
occurred in rural locations, where maintaining an adequate number
of physicians may have been a long-standing problem, according to
some providers. For example, the only hospital in a rural county in
Pennsylvania no longer has full orthopedic on-call surgery coverage
in its emergency room (ER) because three of its five orthopedic sur-
geons left in the spring of 2002, largely in response to the high cost of
malpractice insurance. Similarly, pregnant women in rural central
Mississippi must now travel about 65 miles to the nearest hospital
obstetrics ward to deliver because family practitioners at the local
hospital, faced with rising malpractice insurance premiums, stopped
providing obstetrics services. In both areas, providers also cited other
reasons for difficulties recruiting physicians to their rural areas. We
did not identify similar examples of access reductions attributed to
malpractice pressures in the four states without reported problems.
In the five states with reported problems, however, we also deter-
mined that many of the reported provider actions taken in response to
malpractice pressures were not substantiated or did not widely affect
access to health care. For example, some reports of physicians relo-
cating to other states, retiring, or closing practices were not accurate
or involved relatively few physicians. In these same states, our review
of Medicare claims data did not identify any major reductions in the
utilization of certain services some physicians reported reducing be-
cause they consider the services to be high risk, such as certain ortho-
pedic surgeries and mammograms. Continuing to monitor the effect
of providers' responses to rising malpractice premiums on access to




64. GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP. 03-836, Medical Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premi-
ums on Access to Health Care (Aug. 2003) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03836.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2003) (hereinafter General Accounting Office).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
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The GAO's report is in line with some of the findings and recommen-
dations of "Texas Medical Professional Liability Study Commission"
made in 1975.66 The GAO report suggests facts that existed long before
the Texas Legislature enacted its non-economic damage cap. Caps can-
not legitimately be expected to reduce insurance rates and provide af-
fordable, quality healthcare.6 7 It necessarily follows that non-economic
damage caps in medical malpractice cases are arbitrary and not rational,
"let alone 'precisely tailored' to effectuate its proposed governmental in-
terests., 68 Rather, the Texas Legislature has enacted a statute "which, at
best, 'marginally serves' the interest of reducing insurance rates," while
simultaneously harming a cognizable group of injured medical malprac-
tice victims who bring suit.69 The Texas Legislature has failed to give
serious consideration to a measure imperative to reduce rising insurance
premiums: placing limits on the amount of rate hikes insurance compa-
nies can make.70 "Laws are not only intended to act as a guide, but to
deter harmful behavior., 71 The cap on non-economic damages in medi-
cal malpractice cases "eludes the latter goal of the law, and, in fact," en-
courages health care providers to take fewer precautionary measures in
their procedures, "knowing that any case will be limited in award, and
likewise limited in settlement negotiations. "72
Despite studies indicating that a cap on non-economic damages does
not prevent insurance premiums from rising,73 the legislature enacted a
statute that disproportionately harms those victims with little to no eco-
nomic damages and quantifiable non-economic damages. The statute has
taken away medical malpractice victims' fundamental right to a meaning-
ful jury trial.74 This statute is irrational and arbitrary because there is no
correlation between capping non-economic damages (in an effort to stunt
rising malpractice premiums) and better access to healthcare. 75
The Texas Legislature's statute discriminates between those medical
malpractice victims with no economic damages and those with economic
damages. In essence, the poorer the victim the more likely their amount
66. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. 1988).
67. Id. (illustrating that an independent study could not find a relationship).
68. Cf., Fox, supra note 46, at 1399-1400.
69. Id. at 1400.
70. See, e.g., id. (addressing the Michigan legislature's need to address other factors
imperative to reduce rising insurance premiums).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging a cap on damages in products liability suits will cause
defendants to exercise less care knowing that awards will be limited in amount).
73. General Accounting Office, supra note 64, at 30; Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. 1988).
74. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15.
75. General Accounting Office, supra note 64, at 7.
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of damages will be capped at the statutory amount. It is clear that the
non-economic damage caps are not narrowly tailored to resolve the pro-
posed problems with insurance rates and access to quality affordable
healthcare. Other, less discriminatory means of addressing these issues
include: 1) regulating the insurance industry and its rate increases; and/or
2) creating an injured patient compensation fund.76
B. Open Courts
The Texas Constitution states that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law."77 While the federal constitution
does not have an open courts provision, most state constitutions have
practically identical guarantees.78 These guarantees are also commonly
known as "remedy, certain remedy, right to remedy, remedy for injury,
access to courts and open access to courts provisions."79
Many times, state constitutional open courts provisions are used to
challenge imposed limits on non-economic damages.81 "As a practical
matter, these provisions are intended to provide citizens of a state with
justice and reasonable access to the courts." 81 However, some courts
have stretched open courts provisions by suggesting that any time a state
legislature limits an injured party's right to sue, it violates the open courts
provision. The Texas Supreme Court has not stretched the Open
Courts Doctrine in such a manner; rather, the Texas Supreme Court has
firmly established an open courts test.83
In Lebohm v. City of Galveston,84 the Texas Supreme Court stated that:
[L]egislative action withdrawing common-law remedies for well es-
tablished common-law causes of action for injuries to one's 'lands,
goods, person or reputation' is sustained only when it is reasonable in
76. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691; The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, To
Solve Malpractice-Insurance Crisis, Roll Back Rates, Not Rights, available at http://
www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/nw/nw003321.php3 (last visited Dec. 6, 2003)
(hereinafter Foundation) (suggesting the regulation of insurance rate hikes is the manner
in which the Legislature should keep premiums down).
77. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
78. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 715.
79. Id.
80. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering
Awards: Turning Compensation Into "'Punishment", 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 62 (2002) (discuss-
ing that "thirty-seven states have open courts provisions in their constitutions, although the
effect of these provisions varies").
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 787 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Tex. 1990).
84. Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. 1955).
20041
THE SCHOLAR
substituting other remedies, or when it is reasonable exercise of the
police power in the interest of the general welfare. Legislative action
of this type is not sustained when it is arbitrary or unreasonable.8 5
The Texas Supreme Court has since affirmed the test set out in
Lebohm.16 In 1983, the Texas Supreme Court in Sax v. Vottler,8 7 set forth
a new test which states that in order to maintain a successful open courts
statutory challenge, a party must show (1) he or she has a "cognizable
common-law cause of action that is being restricted," and (2) the "restric-
tion is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and
basis of the statute.""8 The Supreme Court has stated that the Sax test
does not compel an incorrect analysis.8 9 Applying the test to the statute
at hand, the non-economic damage caps must fail.
Texas has long recognized a common-law action for medical malprac-
tice.9° As such, the first prong is satisfied. The statute fails the second
prong in that it is unreasonable and arbitrary because there is no correla-
tion between a cap on damages and medical malpractice insurance
rates.91 If the Sax test is not met, then the statute is a violation of the
Open Courts Doctrine. 92 As a consequence, the cap on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice cases is unconstitutional.
C. Right of Trial by Jury
The Texas Constitution states that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to
regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency."93 Some
courts have held that malpractice caps infringe upon the right of trial by
jury.94 In Boyd v. Bulala,95 a federal court held the Virginia cap unconsti-
tutional under both the United States and Virginia Constitutions, 96 stat-
ing in part:
85. Id. at 955.
86. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1983); Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d
772, 774 (Tex. 1977).
87. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 661.
88. Id. at 666.
89. Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687, 716 (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 704.
91. General Accounting Office, supra note 64; Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 693.
92. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666; Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 787 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Tex.
1990).
93. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15.
94. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692.
95. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
96. Id. at 789.
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[S]ince the assessment of damages is a fact issue committed to the
jury for resolution, a limitation on the performance of that function
is a limitation on the role of the jury ... This extraordinary require-
ment bears no relation to the doctrines of remittitur, new trial, and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and it cannot be founded
upon the court's inherent power over verdicts and judgments. In-
deed, there exists no permissible basis for entering a judgment pre-
determined by the legislature in place of a judgment on a verdict
properly reached by a jury.97
These arguments do not prove too much for the medical malpractice
victims adversely effected by this Texas legislation.98 The Texas Legisla-
ture is masking unreasonable, arbitrary legislation that invades the right
to trial by jury as legitimate governmental activity.9 9 Medical malpractice
victims are prevented from having a jury assess fully and fairly their
amount of non-economic damages because of the $250,000 limitation.
There is no allowable foundation for entering a judgment predetermined
by the legislature in place of a properly reached jury verdict, especially
when there exists no correlation among damage caps, insurance premi-
ums and access to health care.100 As such, the statute is arbitrary, unrea-
sonable and cap on plaintiffs' right of trial by jury.
D. Prohibition Against Special Laws
The Texas Constitution states that "[t]he Legislature shall not ... pass
any local or special law . .. "o' In Clark v. Finley,10 2 the Texas Supreme
Court defined a "local" law as one that confines its operation "to a fixed
part of the territory of the state."1 °3 A "special law" was defined as "a
statute that relates to particular persons or things of a class."1 ° 4 The non-
economic damage caps constitute a special law in favor of a certain class
of litigants, namely medical malpractice victims with economic damages
as opposed to victims with no economic damages and only non-economic
97. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 711 (Tex. 1988) ( citing Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789
(W.D. Va. 1986); see also Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 263-
64 (1988) (stating that "the Legislature cannot abolish the right to a remedy by capping a
plaintiff's recovery... ").
98. Contra Lucas 757 S.W.2d at 710 (Tex. 1988).
99. Compare Coulter v. Melady, 489 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding right to jury trial not infringed by statutory provision in-
volving lack of consent).
100. General Accounting Office, supra note 64; Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 693.
101. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56.
102. Clark v. Finley, 54 S.W. 343 (Tex. 1899).
103. Id. at 346.
104. Id. at 345.
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damages. The Texas Supreme Court stated in Miller v. El Paso
County10 5:
[t]he courts recognize in the Legislature a rather broad power to
make classifications for legislative purposes and to enact laws for the
regulation thereof, even though such legislation may be applicable
only to a particular class ... [but] such legislation must be intended
to apply uniformly to all who may come within the classification des-
ignated in the Act, and the classification must be broad enough to
include a substantial class and must be based on characteristics legiti-
mately distinguishing such class from others with respect to the pub-
lic purpose sought to be accomplished ... 06
Thus, the Legislature is unquestionably empowered to create classifica-
tions of persons and things, so long as the classifications are not arbitrary.
Where a reasonable relationship exists between the classification and
the objectives "sought to be accomplished by the statute,"' °7 Article III
Section 56 is not violated."°8 Here, the Texas Legislature has created
classifications that are arbitrary. By enacting the non-economic damage
caps on victims of medical malpractice, the Texas legislature has created
at least two classes that will be treated differently under the same circum-
stances.' 0 9 However, the Texas Legislature has decided that a legitimate
medical malpractice plaintiff shall nonetheless be regarded as a frivolous
litigant, the lead factor contributing to increased insurance rates, the ma-
jor blockage to affordable healthcare, "and must be prevented from full
recovery for his actual harm."" 0
The Texas Legislature's cap on non-economic damages is arbitrary. As
previously discussed, no correlation exists among damage caps, insurance
premiums and access to health care."' Rather, the "cap puts enormous
burdens on a small class of persons who are seriously" injured by health
105. Miller v. El Paso County, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001-02 (Tex. 1941).
106. Id. at 1002.
107. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56.
108. See also Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. 1968).
109. Two of the classes created by this statute include the poor and injured with no
economic damages and the wealthy and injured with substantial economic damages.
110. See generally, Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 74.302, 2003 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 873; Fox, supra note 46, at 1403-04. Refer to the author's statement at note
46.
111. General Accounting Office, supra note 64, at 7; Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687, 694 (Tex. 1988).
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care providers, "with only a 'marginal' chance that those harms may re-
sult in lowered insurance premiums" to insurance companies.
1 12
E. Separation of Powers
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided
into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a
separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to
one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judi-
cial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one
of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to
either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly
permitted. 1
13
The Texas Legislature has infringed upon "the court's power to declare
[a jury] award excessive," subjecting it to remittitur, and "has substituted
its own judgment for that of the jury and the court." '11 4 The Texas Legis-
lature has decided that medical malpractice jury verdicts over the cap are
excessive. 115 The Texas Legislature does not partake in court proceed-
ings and decide the reasonableness of jury awards.116 Therefore, the Leg-
islature is in no position to make such per se findings. 117 Instead, the
Texas legislature has over-stepped and has taken away the court's power
to render verdicts excessive and reasonable.'1 8 "The Legislature has
changed the court's rules of practice and procedure by taking away such
power."' 19
The non-economic damage cap violates the separation of powers be-
cause of its failure to withstand scrutiny under the test of Mistretta v.
United States.120 In Mistretta, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
"a Congressional delegation of power, away from the traditional role of
the executive branch and into the authority of the judicial branch, did not
violate the separation of powers., 1 21 The Supreme Court found that no
112. Fox, supra note 46, at 1404 (2002). Applying Steve Fox's critique of Michigan's
non-economic damage cap on products liability claims to the Texas legislature's cap on
non-economic cap in medical malpractice cases.
113. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
114. Fox, supra note 46, at 1401-02.
115. Id. at 1401.




120. Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
121. See id. at 412 (holding that Congress can call on the Judiciary's expertise to write
policy); cf Fox, supra note 46, at 1402 (discussing how Michigan's product liability damage
cap fails Mistretta prongs).
20041
THE SCHOLAR
violation would occur unless Congress vested in the judicial branch pow-
ers that "are more appropriately performed by the other branches or that
undermine the integrity of the judiciary." '122 While no separation of pow-
ers violation existed in Mistretta, the Texas Legislature's non-economic
damages cap fails the Mistretta prongs.
First, the judicial branch is vested with the powers of deciding whether
a jury verdict is excessive or not.2 3 The Texas Legislature is in no posi-
tion to conclude that jury awarded non-economic damages are excessive
as they relate to the parties involved.124 The statute has failed the second
Mistretta prong in that the judicial branch's integrity is certain to suffer
because "citizens will perceive the courts as powerless" against big insur-
ance and health care lobbyists who assert major influence over the Legis-
lature."2 5 Applying the Mistretta test to the non-economic damage cap,
the Texas Legislature has "overstepped its authority by exercising powers
which are better left to the judicial branch, thereby undermining the judi-
ciary's integrity.' 26
F. Conflicting Constitutional Provisions
Now that Proposition 12 has passed, there will inherently exist a con-
flict between the new Texas constitutional provision and the Open Courts
Doctrine. 2 7 When a question of the constitutionality of a statute is at
issue, the Texas Supreme Court begins with a presumption that the stat-
ute is valid and that the Texas Legislature has not acted arbitrarily or
unreasonably in passing it.1 2 8 The burden lies upon the party challenging
the newly enacted law to establish its unconstitutionality. 129 Provided
that a reasonable construction can be ascertained rendering the statute
constitutional and that it carries the Texas Legislature's intent, courts
must uphold the law. 3 °
A statute "should not be annulled by the courts merely because doubts
may be suggested raised as to [its] constitutionality."'' Before a statute
122. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385.
123. See Larson v. Cactus Utility Co., 730 S.W. 2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987) (holding that
the rule of remittitur applies to trial courts and courts of appeals).
124. Cf Fox, supra note 46, at 1402 (asserting that the Michigan Legislature should
not substitute its judgement for that of a jury on the issue of excessive damages).
125. Cf. Id.(arguing the negative effect the legislature will have on the judiciary by
taking away litigants' right to full trial when products liability damage caps are in place).
126. Cf Id. (applying Mistretta to Michigan's products liability damage caps).
127. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; Tex. H.R.J. Res. 3, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
128. See Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Ex
parte Anderson, 902 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, pet. ref'd).
129. See Ex parte Anderson, 902 S.W.2d at 698.
130. Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
131. See Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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will be set aside, the act must clearly show that "its validity cannot be
supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption.
' 13 2
Furthermore, Constitutional provisions must be interpreted "in light of
the common law" and in an equitable manner. 133 The Texas Supreme
Court, when interpreting the Texas Constitution, presumes that the text
has been carefully contemplated. 34 When determining the intent of con-
stitutional provisions, the Texas Supreme Court considers such factors as
the historical context and purpose of the provision.135 "When determin-
ing the purpose of a constitutional provision, [courts] will consider the
evil to be remedied and the good [intended] to be accomplished by that
provision.' 136  American Jurisprudence lends the interpretation that
when there exists irreconcilable conflict between two provisions, the spe-
cific will trump the general or the most recent will trump the antecedent
provision. 137 "If there is a real inconsistency between a constitutional
amendment and an antecedent provision, the amendment must prevail
because it is the latest expression of the will of the people.' ' 38
The citizens of Texas were misled by the Legislature who presented
Proposition 12 for vote. "The only reason the [Texas] Legislature sched-
uled an election on a far-reaching proposal to limit monetary damages in
medical malpractice cases for [September] 13, rather than [November] 4,
[was] to discourage voter turnout.' 39 The Texas Legislature, insurance
companies, doctors and other health care providers feared that the more
Texans who voted on Proposition 12 the more likely it would be defeated
by a further-informed public. 141
The Texas Legislature needed the constitutional amendment to be ap-
proved by Texas voters, which is why the election date was so crucial to
its passage.14' "Every regular session of the Legislature produces several
132. Id. at 511.
133. Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 220 S.W.2d 273, 277 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1949, writ ref'd) (quoting Great S. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Austin, 243
S.W. 778, 780 (1922)).
134. Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Gallagher v. State,
690 S.W.2d 587, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
135. See generally Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 38-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en
banc) (explaining Texas Supreme Court analysis in context of determining whether the
Federal or state constitution affords more protection).
136. Aerospace Optimist Club v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 886 S.W.2d 556,
559-60 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
137. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 63 (2003).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Clay Robison, Trying to Slip One By Texas Voters, HOUSTON CHRON., May 25,
2003, Outlook, at 2, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/editorial/robison/





constitutional amendments for voters to consider, and with rare excep-
tions those amendments in recent years have been placed on the Novem-
ber general election ballot. 142  The passage of constitutional
amendments, in odd-numbered years, are often determined in large mu-
nicipalities where city elections attract big voter turnout. 143 Usually, con-
stitutional amendments attract very few voters by themselves. 44 By
scheduling the amendment on medical malpractice for September 13, the
Legislature's quest for low voter turnout was a success and Proposition 12
was narrowly approved.
The passage of Proposition 12 was not a true reflection of the will of
the people because the Legislature misled the public and purposely
scheduled the vote at a time where turnout would likely be low. 1 4 5 The
rebuttable presumption of the amendment's validity is defeated because
there is no "reasonable intendment or allowable presumption".146 The
ends do not justify the means since no correlation exists in capping non-
economic damages and driving down insurance premiums or raising
healthcare access.
IV. PROPOSALS
"The problem of a misperception of problems in tort reform is not new.
Sanders and Joyce have written about 1980s tort reform in Texas, and
documented how legislative decisions were made without an adequate
empirical underpinning. "147 The Texas Legislature should mandate a
study to conduct research and develop a detailed recommendation outlin-
ing how a patient compensation fund or statutory insurance regulation
could be implemented.1 48 According to the Texas Department of Insur-




145. See HOUSE COMM. ON CIVIL PRACTICES, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.J.R. 3, 78th
Leg., R.S. (2003), http://204.65.51.20/data/hrofr/pdr/ba78r/HJR0OO3.pdf (indicating that
some Representatives wanted a November ballot day).
146. Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (citing
53 Tex. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 184, p. 277).
147. Neil Vidmar & Leigh Anne Brown, Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Insur-
ance Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease and Prescribing a Remedy, 22 Miss. C. L.
REV. 9, 39-40 (2002) (citing Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s
Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990)).
148. See, e.g., OHIO DEP'T OF INS., FINAL REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF AN OHIO
PATIENT COMPENSATION FUND, at 1 (May 1, 2003) http://www.ohioinsurance.gov/News
room/scripts/Release.asp?ReleaseID=1584 (explaining Ohio's directive to ascertain the
feasability of a medical malpractice compensation and its effect on stabilizing insurance
premiums) (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
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partment of Insurance to undertake such a study.149 In the hope of
driving down the cost of insurance premiums and making healthcare
more accessible and affordable, the Texas Legislature should consider a
patient compensation fund and insurance regulatory statutes as two alter-
natives to a cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases.
A. Patient Compensation Fund
Texas should follow suit with other states that have provided for a med-
ical malpractice patient compensation fund. The states that currently
have compensation funds are Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.1 50 "These funds,
which are sometimes referred to as excess coverage or excess liability
funds, pay for medical malpractice judgments or settlements that exceed
a statutorily established amount."15'
The way a patient compensation fund operates is that health care prov-
iders buy malpractice premiums from insurance companies in a minimum
statutorily defined amount. 152 Insurance companies pay out claims for
amounts up to the coverage limit.1 53 The insurance companies also pay
an annual assessment to the patient compensation fund, and the excess of
judgments and settlements above the minimum coverage amounts are
paid out from the fund.1
54
A patient compensation fund is one alternative for the Texas Legisla-
ture to consider to legitimately achieve a goal of keeping insurance rates
down and making access to healthcare more affordable to all Texans.
These types of funds are relied upon in other states and Texas should
follow suit.155
B. Regulate Insurance Rates
Another alternative to the passage of non-economic damage caps in
medical malpractice cases is for the Texas Legislature to regulate the rise
of insurance premiums. 156 "If the insurance industry and the medical
149. See State of Texas, Dep't of Ins. (outlining legislation affecting the Department
of Insurance) available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/commish/lege03.html#medical (last vis-
ited Feb, 20, 2004).
150. S.C. DEP'T OF INS., OLR RESEARCH REPORT: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COMPEN-
SATION FUNDS, at 1 (Oct. 22, 2003) http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2003/olrdata/ins/rpt/2003-R-






156. Foundation, supra note 76.
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lobby have their way, Floridians will soon become guinea pigs in an ex-
periment that has failed everywhere else it has been tried: caps of com-
pensation for victims of medical malpractice.''a17 The Texas Legislature
has now taken the step that so many Floridians have feared, which is the
passage of non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice cases.
15 8
Rather than look into a crystal ball to foresee the real effects the caps will
have, all Texas has to do is look at California's experience.1 59
Looking to California as a model reveals that "the only way to cut pre-
miums is to regulate insurance company profits and expenses., 160 The
following observations of California are that:
[the Legislature] has tried it both ways. In the mid-1970s, skyrocket-
ing premiums galvanized doctors to join the insurance industry in
support of damage caps. Intimidated by the medical profession's
threat to leave the state, California lawmakers capped pain and suf-
fering damages at $250,000. The 1975 law enriched the insurance in-
dustry by reducing what it had to pay out to victims of medical
mistakes. But contrary to the insurers' promises, premiums contin-
ued to rise-450 percent in the 13 years after the law's passage.1 '
Texas should learn from the mistakes made by California's Legislature
and its passage of MICRA1 62. At the very least, the Texas Legislature
should assign a commission to ascertain the feasibility of regulating the
rate at which insurance companies can raise premiums via statute; instead
of on the backs of injured patients by limiting their availability of non-
economic damages.
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this comment, it appeared that the real problem the
Governor and Legislature faced was assuring Texans access to quality,
157. See generally id.
158. Id.; Tex. H.J.R. Res. 3, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
159. See generally Tom Dresslar, Law to Lift Cap on Malpractice Claims Unveiled:
Insurers Could React by Hiking Rates, Spurring a Prop. 103 Showdown, L.A. Daily J., May
11, 1999, at 1 (describing the crisis that led to MICRA's passage); Lois Richardson, Why
California Needs MICRA, CAL. HEALTH L. MONITOR, Mar. 9, 1998, 6 No.5 SM-
CAHTHLM 2 (Westlaw).
160. Foundation, supra note 76.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Martin Ramey, Comment, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Need to Re-
examine Damage Caps in California's Elder Abuse Act, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 599, 625
(2002); Health Program Office of Technology Assessment, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON




affordable health care.' 63 In their attempts to achieve this goal, an as-
sault on patient's rights and the power of the courts has come to the fore-
front; with a cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice
lawsuits.
164
The Texas Legislature's statute on non-economic damage caps in medi-
cal malpractice cases is unconstitutional because it violates: 1) the Equal
Protection Clause under both the Federal and Texas Constitutions; 2) the
Texas Open Courts Doctrine; 3) a Patient's Right to Trial by Jury; and the
4) Prohibition against Special Laws. Moreover, the statute's enabling
constitutional amendment is a violation of the Texas Constitution's Sepa-
ration of Powers and must fail as it is not a reflection of the will of the
people.
As a means of deterring lawsuit abuse, lowering medical malpractice
insurance premiums, and having healthcare more accessible and afforda-
ble, the Texas Legislature should consider other statutory alternatives. A
patient compensation fund and insurance regulatory statutes are two op-
tions the Legislature should consider as an alternative to a cap on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice cases. It is only when the Leg-
islature repeals the current non-economic damage caps statute that their
assault on the rights of the injured and the power of the courts will cease.
163. Office of the Governor, supra note 9. (listing priorities outlined by the
Governor).
164. Id.
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